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DOCUMENTS: 
1.  January 26, 1939 The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
760F.62/1911:Telegram 
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
Praha, January 26, 1939 5 p.m. [Received January 26-2: 20 p.m.) 
7. I visited the Foreign Minister yesterday. In contrast with his appearance at the end of 
December he seemed worn and dispirited but this may have been due to the fact that he 
had not been well and carried out his recent trip to Berlin despite a high fever. 
The Reichs Chancellor, he said, had expressed himself as dissatisfied with Czech attitude 
toward several matters principally the Jews, the press, the army and the German minority. 
Hitler had said that he would not be content, until every Jew had been driven out of 
Germany and that he thought that Czechoslovakia, if it wished to show its loyalty to 
Germany and establish proper relations with it, should pursue a like course instead. No 
drastic measures had been taken against the Jews and many of them still occupied high 
positions in the Government as they had under Beneš. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had replied that it was absolutely impossible for Czechoslovakia to pursue toward the 
Jews the same course which had been pursued in Germany. Hitler's reply had been that 
he was not telling Czechoslovakia what to do but that if the Jewish question were not 
settled to Germany's satisfaction Czechoslovakia would have to abide by the 
consequences. The bulk of Hitler's delineations had been in relation to the Jews and he 
had made it clear that until that question was settled no satisfactory relations could be 
established between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Government was now 
considering this matter. 
Hitler had also asked that the Czechoslovak Army be reduced and that the country agree 
to be neutralized or at least to place itself in much the position of Holland and Denmark. 
Germany, Hitler had said, had no desire ever to attack either of those countries and would 
have the same attitude toward Czechoslovakia if she should reduce her army and bring 
herself into harmony with the policies of the Reich. In response to my question the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Hitler positively did not want the Czechoslovak 
Army enlarged or to utilize it to supplement the German Army. 
Another demand of Hitler had been that the Germans now in Czechoslovakia should have 
the right to develop their National Socialist philosophy in this country without hindrance. 
Unless these things should be done it would be impossible for Hitler to guarantee 
boundaries and establish satisfactory relations with Czechoslovakia. 
In response to my question the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Germany had not 
asked for a customs union and that in fact Dr. Ritter, connected with Foreign Office, had 
told him positively that Germany had no intention of doing so. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs added that Germany is this country's largest buyer and that she wants to buy more 
but frank]y says that she will pay only in German goods and she wants to enter into an 
understanding as to the precise goods which are to be accepted in payment. 
It is interesting to note that the Minister for Foreign Affairs' return has been followed by 
the liquidation of a number of Communist labor unions and the suppression of the 
newspaper which was the organ of the pro-Beneš legionnaire group. 
-Carr 
 
2.   February 1, 1939 The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 
760F.62/1914: Telegram 
The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 
Berlin, February 1, 1939-2 p. m. 
[Received February 1-12:03 p. m.] 
83.1. The Czechoslovak Government has informed Germany in a note which has been 
made public that it will permit the activities of the National Socialist Foreign 
Organization among Germans in Czechoslovakia. 
2. The Czechoslovak Minister informs me that in the course of recent discussions here 
with German officials the question arose as to what would be Czechoslovakia's future 
attitude toward the Jewish question. Czechoslovakia took the position that it could not 
resort to anti-Semitic action owing to the grave effects that foreign boycotts would have 
on its difficult trade position. This standpoint was accepted by the German Government. 
-Gilbert 
 
3.  March 10, 1939 The Chargé in Germany (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/600: Telegram 
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State  
Praha, March 10, 1939 
18. According to an official communiqué broadcast here this morning, President Hacha 
has dismissed the entire Slovak Cabinet with the exception of Teplansky, Minister of 
Finance, and Joseph Sivak, Minister of Education, both of whom are moderate members 
of the Slovak Party. Sidor remains Deputy Prime Minister in the Central Government. At 
the same time it is stated that the Central Government has assured Slovakia financial 
assistance for economic reconstruction. 
This change follows closely upon the attempt within the past week (see my dispatch 345 
sent by air mail this morning) to settle differences between the Slovak and the Central 
Government hinging chiefly upon the question of financial assistance to Slovakia and its 
constitutional status within the state. The action is claimed to have been taken in full 
agreement with all responsible Slovak authorities are said to realize that the existence of 
Slovakia can be secured only within the outline of the present Czechoslovak Republic (as 
declared by the Slovak Government on Saturday) and the Pittsburgh Agreement and 
therefore answers the program of the Hlinka Party. 
At the request of the President of Czechoslovakia, Sokol, speaker Slovak Diet, has come 
to Praha and is discussing the formation of a new Slovak government. Sivak en route to 
Rome as delegate of the Slovak Government to the Papal coronation has been recalled to 
Praha. Meanwhile Teplansky is in charge of the Government in Bratislava. 
The changes seem to eliminate most of those personages who were furthering a separatist 
movement and who were reputed to be carrying on direct negotiations with Berlin. 
Moreover, the changes would seem to represent the Central Government's conditions for 
the financial aid essential to repair the large deficit in the Slovak budget and indicate a 
stronger attitude which it is presumed must have been taken with the actual or tacit 
approval of Berlin. The Foreign Minister told me yesterday that Germany is not 
supporting separatist activities in Slovakia, although I learn from other non-governmental 
sources which I consider reliable that the secessionist policy has been actively 
encouraged from Vienna if not from Berlin. 
The dismissals seem to have been precipitated by propaganda in favor of Slovak 
independence carried on by Tuka and Slovak propaganda chief Mach, and the increasing 
disorder in Slovakia culminating in disturbances at various points in the province 
yesterday. In neither case was the Slovak Government strong enough to exercise the 
necessary control and it became imperative that drastic measures be taken. The dismissed 
Ministers and Mach and Tuka are reported to be under detention in Bratislava and public 
buildings there are occupied by the military. Order is said to prevail. 
-Carr 
 
4.  March 14, 1939 The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/614 
The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State 
March 14, 1939-2 p. m.  
166. Developments during the last 12 hours indicate that the Germans intend to take 
decisive action in connection with the Slovakian crisis. 
It looks now as though this intervention may consist (1) of a military occupation not only 
of Slovakia and Ruthenia but possibly also Bohemia and Moravia or (2) the possibility of 
setting up an independent Slovakia and Ruthenia under German protectorate. While the 
development toward the crisis appears to be as grave as those preceding the occupation of 
Austria and the Sudeten area the reaction on the part of the Western powers appears not 
to be serious. 
The British Counselor, who returned from London today, states that the British Foreign 
Office is inclined to regard any move by the Germans in Czechoslovakia with calmness 
and will advise the British Government against assuming a threatening attitude when in 
fact it contemplates doing nothing. He stated in short that "the British Government were 
reconciled to a possibly extreme German action in Czechoslovakia". The British 
Embassy has no information as to what Hitler intends. 
Troop movements identified indicate German military action in force in which possibly 
40 divisions will participate. Military opinion in Berlin is divided as to whether the Poles 
will do nothing or attempt to occupy Ruthenia. 
-Geist 
 
5.  March 14, 1939 The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/626 
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
Paris, March 14, 1939-7 p. m.  
480. I called on Bonnet (French Minister of Foreign Affairs) this evening to ask for 
information with regard to the situation in Slovakia. He read to me a telegram which he 
had just received from Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin. Coulondre said that he 
had called on Weisz”cker today. Weisz”cker had said that there were 12 to 14 German 
divisions on the Czech frontier. The German Government considered the Government of 
M. Tiso the only legal government of Slovakia and had warned the Czechoslovak 
Government not to interfere with its operations. No ultimatum had yet been sent to the 
Czechoslovak Government. 
The British ChargÈ d'Affaires in Berlin also saw Weisz”cker today and his impression 
was that the Germans did not intend to march into the territories controlled by the 
Czechoslovak Government. 
On the other hand, the French Minister in Praha had telegraphed that both he and the 
Government in Praha believed that a German attack on the Czechoslovak Army was 
imminent. The Germans desired to destroy all power of resistance of the Czechoslovaks 
and for this purpose desired to destroy completely the Czechoslovak Army. 
Bonnet said that he personally did not believe that Germany would go this far at once. 
While I was with Bonnet he telephoned to Daladier and consulted him with regard to the 
course that France should pursue, giving him the information recorded above. 
Daladier and Bonnet decided that Bonnet should send immediately an instruction to 
Coulondre in Berlin ordering him to go at once to the German Foreign Office and to state 
that present German actions were in entire disaccord with the Munich agreements and 
that the French Government would regard most seriously any entry of German troops into 
the territories now controlled by the Czechoslovak Government Coulondre was given 
discretion as to the wording of his remarks even to the point of being authorized to make 
them in the form of asking for information. 
Bonnet said that the British Government had been in contact with him this afternoon and 
that the British simply did not know what to do. 
I asked Bonnet what action would be taken by the French Government if in spite of 
Coulondre's demarche German troops should enter Czech territories. He said he had no 
idea, which is quite true. 
-Bullitt 
 
6.  March 15, 1939 The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/657 
Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador in 
France (Bullitt) and the Acting Secretary of State 
[Washington] March 15, 1939-3:20 p.m.  
Mr. Welles: What is happening today? 
Mr. Bullitt: I have just seen Bonnet and the German Ambassador handed him half an 
hour ago a note from his Government saying that since everything which had happened 
had happened at the request of the Czech Government which was unable to preserve 
order, and since he had taken possession of the territory at the request of the Czech 
Government, there was no cause for France to get excited about anything. He said he 
received this note and made no comment of any kind. He saw him for just about two 
minutes because I was waiting to go in myself. In general the news of what had happened 
was not published until this afternoon because it happened too late for the early morning 
papers and the reaction is just beginning, but the people over here in general are 
completely stunned by these repeated blows. I do not know how pronounced the reaction 
will be, press reaction, I mean. There is the most intense and violent private feeling. I 
wanted to ask you if there was a possibility that we might have something to say. 
Mr. Welles: I spoke with the President this morning and also gave him your telegram. He 
has decided that he is not going to say anything at this time; and with regard to neutrality 
legislation, since there is every prospect that that will be coming along satisfactorily in 
the immediate future, he does not want to tie that up with this. 
Mr. Bullitt: Is the reaction of the country as intense as I have been led to believe? 
Mr. Welles: The reaction is exactly what you could expect, but at the same time there is a 
very definite feeling, so far as I can see from the press, that there is nothing personal, 
intimately personal, about it. It is a reaction to something horrifying and shocking but not 
personally connected, and from the impressions I get-I was up two hours and a half with 
the Foreign Relations Committee this morning the impressions that I get are that it would 
be very much better not to link this up with neutrality legislation since I think that will be 
coming along in very satisfactory form. 
  
7.  March 15, 1939 The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/645: Telegram 
The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State  
Berlin, March 15, 1939-3 p.m. 
172. I saw Dr. Woermann of the Foreign Office this morning and informed him that I had 
noted in the press the Chancellor's proclamation and the agreement between the 
authorities of Czechoslovakia and the Reich and the newspaper reports of other events 
now taking place in Czechoslovakia and requested whatever information he could give 
concerning these matters. Dr. Woermann stated that he was not in a position to give any 
definite information with regard to the status of Czechoslovakia beyond what had 
appeared in the press and that he thought decisions would be rapidly made and the status 
clarified in several days. He informed me that instructions had been given to allow 
diplomatic missions and consulates in Praha to continue to communicate with their 
governments; that Herr Ritter had been appointed diplomatic liaison officer whose 
headquarters would be at the German Legation in Praha. 
I brought up the question of the protection of American citizens, their property and their 
interests in Czechoslovakia, and Dr. Woermann said that he considered the commanders 
of the German forces in Moravia and in Bohemia would be responsible in those districts; 
he was unable to make any statement with regard to the responsible authorities in 
Slovakia or Ruthenia with respect to the protection of properties of foreigners. He 
believed that any questions arising could be discussed with Herr Ritter in Praha until the 
status of all the territory concerned became clear. 
-Geist 
 
8.  March 15, 1939 The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/631: Telegram 
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
Praha, March 15, 1939-6 a. m. 
82. The occupation of the remainder of this country by German troops is scheduled to 
begin at this moment, i.e., 6 a. m. 




9.  March 15, 1939 The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/657 
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
Paris, March 15, 1939-9 p. m. 
491. Bonnet said to me this evening that the German Ambassador had delivered to him a 
note on behalf of his Government in which it was stated that since the Czechoslovak 
Government had requested Hitler to take charge of Bohemia and Moravia because the 
Czechoslovak Government was unable to preserve order in those districts and since 
everything that had happened was in accordance with the desires of the Czechoslovak 
Government there was no cause for France to be in the least excited about the 
developments. I asked him what he had replied He said that he had received the note and 
said nothing. 
I asked Bonnet if the French Government intended to make any statement or to react in 
any way. He said that Coulondre had asked for information at the Foreign Office in 
Berlin today and that Alphand, Director of Commercial Accords, had received orders to 
return to Paris and to break off the commercial negotiations which were about to be 
brought to a successful conclusion. There would be a debate in the Chamber of Deputies 
on Thursday or Friday in which both he and Daladier would express the point of view of 
the French Government. 
I asked Bonnet what he envisaged for the future. He said that he could not see any 
possibility of any successful negotiations any-where in Europe at the present time. There 
was nothing for France and England to do but to arm as fast as possible and stand ready 
to meet any attack. He then said "You must help us." I passed over this remark and began 
to ask him other questions but he repeated "The United States must help us." I asked what 
he meant by this and he said "You must support us in any way you can". I said that there 
were very decided limits on any support to be expected from the United States. He 
replied "At least you can change the Neutrality Act so that we can get arms and 
munitions from America". 
-Bullitt 
 
10.  March 16, 1939 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of 
Controls (Green) 
740.00/640 
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Controls (Green) 
[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1939. 
The British Ambassador called at my office this morning to discuss some problems 
which have arisen in connection with the administration of the Act of June 8, 1938, 
requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals. Before he took up that matter, 
however, we had some general conversation in regard to the present situation in Europe. I 
asked him whether during his stay in England he had found any considerable number of 
persons of the opinion that "peace in our time" had been assured. 
He replied emphatically in the negative, saying that he had discussed the matter with all 
sorts of people and that no one to whom he had talked-"not even the Prime Minister"-was 
now of the opinion that war could be indefinitely postponed. He went on to tell me at 
some length of the British preparations for defense. 
Joseph C. Green 
 
11.  March 16, 1939 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of 
European Affairs (Moffat) 
701.60F11/273 
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat) 
Washington, March 16, 1939 
The Czechoslovak Minister, Dr. Hurban, came to see me on a number of matters: 
(1) Dr. Hurban said that he had been talking with Mr. Beneš and Mr. Jan Masaryk 
concerning what he should do in the way of turning over his Legation if ordered to do so. 
The tentative conclusion that he had reached was not to turn over the Legation until he 
had received written orders from President Hacha. He would not accept telegraphic orders 
as anyone could sign Hacha's name to a telegram. He had this morning sent a message to 
his colleagues in Paris and London inquiring what they were doing, but had not yet 
received a reply. 
He asked for my comment on his plans. I told him that at first blush I would well 
understand his desire to be perfectly certain that he was carrying out the wishes of his 
Government, and that in any event I thought he was well advised to do nothing 
precipitately. 
(2) Dr. Hurban was increasingly worried concerning the safety of Miss Alice Masaryk. 
He said that a plane had reached London having on board General Syrovy and Premier 
Beran. Miss Masaryk was not on the plane. He understood that the Germans now had 
orders to shoot down any Czech plane in the air. I called up Mr. Norman Davis" again, 
who agreed to send off a telegram this morning to de Rouget of the League of Red Cross 
Societies in Paris urging him to give Miss Masaryk a post, and to use the influence of the 
Society in getting her out of Bohemia. 
(3) Dr. Hurban inquired about the status not only of Czech officials but of their personal 
employees and servants in the matter of their visas. I took the Minister to call on Mr. 
Avra Warren, who explained the situation as it affected different categories of official 
diplomats, consuls, servants, those married to Americans, et cetera. He also told the 
Minister about certain private bills that had been introduced. 
(4) Dr. Hurban touched lightly and in strict confidence on the financial embarrassment in 
which Czechoslovak officials would find themselves by virtue of their official salaries 
being (presumably) cut off. I shall not make this part of the conversation a matter of 
record. 
(5) The Minister reverted to the claims of the Germans that Hacha had invited them into 
the country, and thought that from everybody's point of view it was essential to get this 
phase of the matter cleared up. 
Pierrepont Moffat 
 
12.  March 16, 1939 The Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat) to the 
Under Secretary of State 
701.60F11/272 
The Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat) to the Under Secretary of State 
[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1939. 
MR. WELLES: The Czechoslovak Minister has just telephoned that upon returning to his 
Legation from the Department of State he received a call from Herr Resenberg. The latter 
read him an excerpt of a telegram directing Dr. Thomsen to get in touch at once with Dr. 
Hurban, explain to him the developments that had taken place, and take over the 
Czechoslovak Legation. 
The Czechoslovak Minister replied that he did not take orders from Berlin, and that the 
only condition under which he would turn over the Legation was upon receipt of written 
orders from President Hacha.  
Dr. Resenberg endeavored to read a number of messages, telegrams and clippings, which 
he said would explain the situation, but Dr. Hurban replied that he was not interested in 
messages from Berlin, and could only consider messages from Praha as being applicable 
to him. 
Later the Minister called up and asked if I saw objection to his telling this to the press. I 
replied that as the U. P. already carried a story that Dr. Thomsen was on his way to ask 




13.   March 17, 1939 The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 
800F.00/679: Telegram 
The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 
ROME; March 17, 1939-1 p.m.  
[Received March 17-9: 20 a.m.] 
91. My telegram number 90, March 16. I told Ciano this morning that I had come to him 
in the thought that he might give me some statement regarding the Italian Government's 
attitude toward events in Central Europe which I could transmit to Washington. He 
replied somewhat hesitatingly that developments had proceeded in accordance with the 
Rome-Berlin Axis and added with even more hesitation "and in accordance with an 
understanding between the German and Italian Governments." He used the expression 
that developments had proceeded "in their normal course".  
I asked him whether my impression was correct that the Italian Government had agreed 
previously to the separation of Slovakia from Bohemia and Moravia. He replied that I 
was "neither correct nor incorrect in this impression." 
I said that Hitler's performance had greatly shocked American public opinion and that 
while naturally I had no communication to make from my Government I did wish to tell 
him that the brutal methods employed by Hitler in seizing Bohemia and Moravia by 
armed force had created a profound impression in the United States. Ciano seemed 
interested and I repeated that such was indeed a fact. He made a point of the lack of 
national spirit exhibited by the Czechs as indicated by the fact that they had not fired a 
single shot. Adding that Hacha and Chvalkovsky had gone to Berlin and "given away 
their country", he exclaimed "what could be said for a country which showed so little 
spirit of resistance". 
As I was leaving I adverted to Ciano's opening statement that developments had 
proceeded normally under the Rome-Berlin Axis and I inquired whether I might transmit 
this to Washington. He became distinctly confused and asked me not to do so. After 
endeavoring for some moments to think of the proper phrase he said "there were no 
adjectives which could be used." His confusion and inability or unwillingness to 
formulate any statement would seem to justify the inference that the seizure of Bohemia 
and Moravia had come as a disagreeable surprise. 
Phillips 
 
14.  March 17, 1939 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Czechoslovakia 
(Carr) 
860F.00/703a: Telegram 
The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) 
WASHINGTON, March 17, 1939-1 p.m. 
14. The Department would appreciate receiving from you as soon as you can prepare it a 
telegram somewhat along the following lines, but in greater factual detail. 
Since Bohemia and Moravia have been occupied by Germany which has declared a 
protectorate and sent military officials to assume the functions of government; since 
Slovakia, through her President, has asked Hitler to assume a protectorate, and since 
Ruthenia is now occupied by Hungarian troops, there are no Czechoslovak officials with 
whom you can carry on business. In the circumstances you request instructions as to your 
future activities. 
Upon receipt of such a telegram we shall reply directing you to close the Legation and 
turn over the files and archives to the Consul General, and to return to Washington at 
your convenience. 
Your telegram should he drafted in such form that if we desire it can be given publicity. 
Welles 
 
15.   March 17, 1939 The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/687 : Telegram 
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State. 
PARIS, March 17, 1939-4 p.m.  
[Received 6:05 p.m.] 
498. The shock of Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia stunned not only the members of 
the Government but all Frenchmen. Thought as to the future has, however, already begun 
to crystallize in the following manner: 
The invasion of Czechoslovakia ends definitely all possibility of diplomatic negotiations. 
Seven specific promises by Hitler that he would not invade Czechoslovakia were broken 
by this action and it is no longer possible to have confidence in any promises he may 
make  
Mussolini is considered as unscrupulous as Hitler and it is believed with equal force that 
no confidence can be had in any promises by Mussolini. The practice of diplomacy 
therefore becomes impossible. Nothing remains but to develop as much armed force as 
possible, as rapidly as possible, to await the day when Germany and Italy will strike 
against France and England. 
It is believed that this day may arrive as early as the 26th of the month. Reports from 
Italy indicate that Mussolini's prestige with his own people has been diminished so 
seriously by Hitler's advance in Central Europe that he must attempt to make annexations 
for Italy. It is thought that he may first seize Albania but it is also thought that he may 
consider his present control over Albania sufficient and may first act by an advance on 
Djibouti. The French troops at Djibouti will resist and war will result not only in Africa 
but also in Europe. 
It is believed that Hitler has promised Mussolini his support in such a war but would like 
to have Mussolini adjourn action until after he, Hitler, should have reduced Hungary and 
Rumania to the position of vassal states. It is not believed that Mussolini will wait for this 
new advance by Hitler even though Hitler may predict confidently that he will have both 
Hungary and Rumania in hand within a month. 
Reports indicate that extreme fear of Hitler is now prevalent throughout Eastern Europe 
especially in Lithuania and the other Baltic States, in Rumania and in Hungary. There is 
consternation in Poland; but it is believed that the Poles will have the courage to fight if 
Hitler makes any direct attack on Polish territory. No assistance is expected from the 
Soviet Union against Germany unless Soviet territory is attacked. 
The French are making every effort to persuade the British to introduce conscription and 
to prepare for immediate war. 
There is no excitement in Paris or in France. There is only regret that Hitler's action has 
ended the period when it was still possible to hope that constructive diplomatic action 
might maintain peace. 
 
16.  March 17, 1939 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Czechoslovakia 
(Carr) 
860F.00/690a: Telegram 
The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) 
WASHINGTON, March 17, 1939- 6 p. m. 
15. At the press conference today I issued the following statement of the position of this 
Government toward recent developments in Czechoslovakia: 
[Here follows text of press release printed supra.] 
We hope that you may be able to make this available to the Czechoslovak press and that 
the latter may find a way to give it publicity. 
Welles 
 
17.  March 17, 1939 The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/691: Telegram 
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
PRAHA, March 17, 1939-11 p. m.  
[Received March 17; 11:40 a. m.] 
51. In recapitulation of my several telegrams of the last few days permit me to review as 
follows the present situation in this area. 
Bohemia and Moravia have been occupied by German military forces. They have been 
declared by the Reichs Chancellor to be a protectorate of the Reich and to constitute a 
part of greater Germany. According to this same declaration their head of state must 
enjoy the confidence of the Reichs Chancellor, and their foreign affairs and military 
protection are taken over by the Reich. German military and civil authorities have 
assumed administrative power in the provinces. The Czechoslovak Foreign Office has 
been closed. 
The Reichs Chancellor is reported to have accepted the request of the Slovak President 
that he take Slovakia under his protection. 
Indirect reports from Ruthenia, which is now completely cut off from Praha indicate that 
that province is partially occupied by Hungarian troops and that there are no authorities 
left who could be considered as representing the power of the Czechoslovak State. 
There are consequently no officials of the Czechoslovak Government to which I am 
accredited with whom I can maintain relations for the protection of the interests of the 
United States and its citizens. 
In these circumstances I respectfully request instructions in regard to my future course. 
 
18.  March 17, 1939 The German Chargé (Thomsen) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/756 
The German Chargé (Thomsen) to the Secretary of State 
[Translation] 
WASHINGTON, March 17, 1939. 
MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: By direction of the German Government, I have the 
honor to notify the Government of the United States of America of the following decree 
of March 16 of the Government of the Reich on the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia : 
"Article 1. The areas of the former Czechoslovak Republic occupied by German troops 
belong from now on to the domain of the Greater German Reich and come under its 
protection as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 
"Article 2. The German inhabitants of the Protectorate become nationals and, under the 
provisions of the Reich Citizens Law of September 1935, citizens of the Reich. With 
respect to them, there-fore, the provisions for the protection of the German blood and the 
German honor also apply. They are subject to the jurisdiction of German courts. The 
other inhabitants become nationals of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 
"Article 3. The Protectorate is autonomous and administers its own affairs. It exercises its 
rights of sovereignty granted it within the framework of the Protectorate in harmony with 
the political, military and economic requirements of the Reich. The rights of sovereignty 
will be exercised by its own organs and its own authorities with officials of its own. 
"Article 4. The head of the autonomous government of the Protectorate enjoys the 
protection and the honors of the head of a state. The head of the Protectorate must have 
the confidence of the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich for the exercise of his office. 
"Article 5. As protector of the interests of the Reich, the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the 
Reich appoints the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, whose seat is Prague. The 
Reich Protector has the duty of seeing to the observance of the political policies of the 
Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich. The members of the Protectorate government are 
confirmed by the Reich Protector. The latter is empowered to have himself informed 
regarding all measures of the government of the Protectorate and to give it advice. He 
may veto measures capable of injuring the Reich, and in case there is danger in delay, he 
may take the measures necessary for the common interest. The promulgation of laws, 
regulations and other legal prescriptions, as well as the execution of administrative 
measures and court orders having the force of law is to be suspended if the Reich 
Protector interposes a veto. 
"Article 6. The Reich takes charge of the foreign affairs of the Protectorate, and in 
particular of the protection of its nationals in foreign countries. The Reich will conduct 
foreign affairs in accordance with the common interests. The Protectorate is given a 
representative near the Reich Government with the official designation of Minister. 
"Article 7. The Reich grants military protection to the Protectorate. In the exercise of this 
protection, the Reich maintains garrisons and military establishments in the Protectorate. 
For maintaining internal security and order, the Protectorate may organize its own units. 
Their organization, strength, number and armament are determined by the Government of 
the Reich. 
"Article 8. The Reich exercises direct supervision over transportation, mail and 
telecommunications. 
"Article 9. The Protectorate belongs to the customs territory of the Reich and is under its 
customs sovereignty. 
"Article 10. Until further notice, the crown is legal tender together with the Reichsmark 
The relation of the two currencies to each other is determined by the Reich Government. 
"Article 11. The Reich can issue legal regulations valid for the Protectorate, in so far as 
the common interests so require. In so far as a common need exists, the Reich can 
transfer administrative branches to its own administration and provide the officials 
belonging to the Reich who are needed therefor. The Government of the Reich can take 
the measures necessary for the maintenance of security and order. 
"Article 12. The law now in effect in Bohemia and Moravia remains in force, in so far as 
it does not contradict the sense of the assumption of protection by the German Reich.  
"Article 13. The Reich Minister of the Interior issues, in agreement with the Reich 
Ministers concerned, the legal and administrative regulations necessary for the execution 
and supplementing of this decree." 
Under Article 6 of this decree the German Reich takes charge of the foreign affairs of the 
Protectorate, in particular, of the protection of its nationals in foreign countries. The 
former diplomatic representatives of Czechoslovakia in foreign countries are no longer 
qualified for official acts. 
Accept [etc.] Thomsen 
 
19.  March 17, 1939 Statement issued to the Press by the Acting Secretary of State 
860F.00/712 
Statement issued to the Press by the Acting Secretary of State 
March 17, 1939 
The Government of the United States has on frequent occasions stated its conviction that 
only through international support of a program of order based upon law can world peace 
be assured. 
This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human liberty and of 
democracy, cannot refrain from making known this country's condemnation of the acts 
which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a free and 
independent people with whom, from the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia 
attained its independence, the people of the United States have maintained specially close 
and friendly relations. 
The position of the Government of the United States has been made consistently clear. It 
has emphasized the need for respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, 
and for non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other nations; and it has 
on repeated occasions expressed its condemnation of a policy of military aggression. 
It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary force are threatening world 
peace and the very structure of modern civilization. The imperative need for the 
observance of the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly 
demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during the past three days. 
 
20.  March 18, 1939 The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/692: Telegram 
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
PRAHA, March 18, 1939- 6 p.m.  
[Received March 18- 2:55 p.m.] 
52. Your No.15, March 17. The entire press here is under strict German control, the 
Gestapo is everywhere and it would be virtual suicide for anyone to publish the statement 
unless indeed it first appeared in Berlin press. 
Carr 
 
21.  March 18, 1939 The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/698: Telegram 
The Consul at Geneva (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State 
GENEVA, March 18, 1939- 6 p. m  
[Received March 18- 4:35 p. m.] 
51. The consensus of responsible Secretariat and other informed opinion at Geneva 
regarding the situation resulting from the German annexation of Czechoslovakia may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. The latest German move by its revelation, even to the most skeptical, of the 
ruthlessness of German methods and the extent of her ultimate aims has marked a turning 
point in the European situation and has rendered an eventual war almost inevitable. The 
Czech annexation is considered as Hitler's first great error since it can not be justified on 
racial or other reasonable grounds and starkly reflects a determination to extend German 
expansion to such an extent that this ambition can only be checked by force. 
2. Further German moves in Eastern Europe are expected to take place in the near future. 
It is thought that such future moves will as in the case of Czechoslovakia, be directed 
either to securing Germany's "back door" in preparation for a move to the west or be 
preliminary to a further rapid expansion eastward or both. 
3. As regards the highly desirable possibility of rallying the small states of Europe, 
particularly of Southeastern Europe, against further German attacks, this is thought to 
present great difficulties unless Great Britain and France are prepared immediately to 
take such a strong stand that they could not recede therefrom at the last moment. In the 
light of what has taken place in Europe during the past year, no small state or group of 
states it is felt would dare risk resistance to a German attack without the certainty of 
immediate and effective support from these two countries. More than ever there is much 
pessimism not only as regards the determination but also the ability of France and Great 
Britain to afford such support at present. 
4. The position of Russia both as to her willingness and her ability to give effective aid 
presents a big question mark and must inevitably affect British and French policy. 
5. The importance of Mediterranean as an immediate danger spot is stressed. One view 
expressed is that Mussolini has two main alternatives, (a) now feeling the German 
menace himself, come to terms with the British and French in return for their protection 
against Germany or (b) push his demands against France to the point of risking a war on 
the gamble that Hitler would be forced through fear of losing Italy as an ally to come to 
her assistance. Grave concern is felt here lest Mussolini choose the second alternative 
since the first would entail the abandonment of his dreams of empire. This concern is 
increased by the feeling that in the last analysis Hitler could not afford to see Italy 
defeated even though a war to save Italy would be highly unpopular in Germany. 
Finally, these predictions and preoccupations are based upon the premise that any major 
hostilities in either Eastern Europe or in the Mediterranean would eventually extend into 
a general war and that such hostilities might in the existing situation be provoked by even 
a minor incident. 
Bucknell 
 
22.  March 18, 1939 The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/608 
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State 
Paris, March 18, 1939 -7p. m.  
470. We are told by the Czech Legation that the present situation in Slovakia has been 
created deliberately by the Germans because of the refusal of the Czech Government and 
people to hand over control of their country to Germany. The Czech Government has 
withstood demands by Germany for the dismissal of officials who had been associated 
with Beneš and Czech financial and business people have refused to sell the controlling 
interest in their concerns to Germans. The Nazis therefore determined to get at Bohemia 
and Moravia by first obtaining control of Slovakia. If the attempted coup had succeeded 
on the 10th it was intended to proclaim immediately not only a so-called independent 
Slovakia but also a customs and monetary union between Slovakia and Germany. 
Our informant said that the Nazis had been greatly assisted by the political incapacity and 
venality of the Slovaks. The Germans have already acquired control of the principal 
Slovak industries and mining properties including all lands where oil is believed to exist: 
in fact, "the Germans have already bought Slovakia". 
In the opinion of our informant the Nazis will not rest until they have a government in 
Praha completely subservient to their wishes. Once this has been accomplished it will 
then be the turn of Hungary and after that of Rumania. The French listen sympathetically 
but are doing nothing. The British have appeared to be entirely without interest in the 
matter until this afternoon when the Czechoslovak Legation here heard from London that 
the British Government had made some statement, whether to the press or to the German 
Government was not clear, to the effect that they were in fact interested in this latest 
crisis affecting Czechoslovakia. 
In reply to a question regarding the status of the guarantee of Czechoslovakia's frontiers 
promised at Munich we were told that about a month ago the Czechoslovak Government 
raised this question with the French and British Governments. These Governments took 
the matter up with Berlin, but were informed that the guarantee could not be made 
effective until the problem of Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia had 
been adjusted-whatever that might mean. There the matter has been allowed to rest. 
-Bullitt 
 
23.  March 18, 1939 The German Chargé (Thomsen) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/756 
The German Chargé (Thomsen) to the Secretary of State 
[Translation] 
WASHINGTON, March 18, 1939. 
MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Following my note of the 17th of this month, I have the 
honor to make known to Your Excellency, below, the preamble to the decree of March 
16th of the Reich Government on the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia. This preamble, which had not reached me before, forms an integral part of the 
decree mentioned. It reads as follows: 
"For a thousand years the lands of Bohemia and Moravia belonged to the living area of 
the German people. 
"Force and want of understanding arbitrarily tore them from their ancient historic 
surroundings and finally by their incorporation in the artificial structure of 
Czechoslovakia created the center of constant unrest 
"From year to year the danger increased that a new and terrible threat to the peace of 
Europe would come from this area, as it once did in the past. 
"For the Czechoslovak State and its rulers had not succeeded in organizing the common 
life of the national groups arbitrarily united m it and thereby in arousing and maintaining 
the interest of all concerned in the maintenance of their common State. 
"In that way, however, it displayed its internal incapacity for life and therefore it has now 
fallen into actual disintegration. 
"The German Reich, however, cannot permit any continuous disturbances in these 
regions, of such decisive importance to its own peace and security and to the general 
welfare and the general peace. 
"Sooner or later it was bound, as the power most interested and sympathetically affected 
because of the historical and geographic situation, to have to bear the most serious 
consequences. 
"It is therefore in keeping with the law of self-preservation if the German Reich has 
determined to intervene decisively for the restoration of the bases for a reasonable order 
in Central Europe and to take the measures arising therefrom. 
"For it has already prove d in its historical past of a thousand years that it alone is called 
to solve these problems, both because of the greatness and the characteristics of the 
German nation. 
"Filled with earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples dwelling in this area, 
to safeguard the national individuality of the German and the Czech peoples, and to 
further the peace and social welfare of all, I therefore order the following, in the name of 
the German Reich, as the basis for the future common life of the in-habitants of these 
regions:" 
Accept [etc.] Thomsen 
 
24. March 19, 1939 Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State  
860F.48/50: Telegram 
Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State  
[Extracts] 
PRAHA, March 19, 1939- 5 p. m.  
[Received 5: 20 p. m.] 
55. From available information it seems clear that the refugee question here has already 
reached a serious stage. Nansen of the Nansen Aid Committee informed me this morning 
that there are several thousand Social Democrats and other political refugees and their 
families here in hiding and in danger of their lives. Many of the women and children are 
spending the days and nights in the woods in the vicinity of Praha notwithstanding that 
the ground is covered by snow. All relief organizations have been forcibly disbanded…. 
The German secret police here are making hundreds and perhaps thousands of arrests in 
the usual Nazi manner; the Jewish population is terrified; as are the Social Democrats and 
also those persons closely associated with the former regime Consequently if action can 
be taken it should be done speedily. While the British legation seems to be hopeful of 
obtaining exit permits for most of its refugee cases I am personally doubtful whether 
Germany would be receptive to requests for the departure of political refugees and Jews 
but it would seem to be the humane duty of our Government to support some kind of 
international action to this end even though doubts may be entertained as to the outcome. 
 
25.  March 19, 1939 The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
860F.48/50: Telegram 
Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State  
[Extracts] 
PRAHA, March 19, 1939- 5 p. m.  
[Received 5: 20 p. m.] 
860F.48/52: Telegram 
The Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) to the Secretary of State 
 
PRAHA, March 19, 1939- 6 p.m.  
[Received 6: 40 p.m.] 
56. My 55, March 19, 5 p.m. Fully aware of and in full sympathy with the later reports 
and policy of the United States in regard to immigration, I nevertheless feel that a special 
situation exists here which merits the serious attention of the President and of Congress. 
The Czechoslovak state was in part the creation of the United States of America upon 
whose form of government the Czechoslovaks were proud to model their own. There are 
many here who gave their best efforts over a period of years with the encouragement and 
strengthened support of the United States and other democratic nations to an attempt to 
preserve in Central Europe an independent state devoted to the principles of liberty for 
which the United States stands. They made extraordinary progress in public 
improvements, education and social welfare. They may justly be proud of their 
contribution to progressive and enlightened government. Through no real fault of theirs 
their independence has ended. The men who were the leaders in the establishment of the 
Czechoslovak state, the public servants who patriotically carried on the public work often 
times under great handicaps, and some men of industry and business who devoted their 
best efforts to the building up of the state are now under arrest hunted by secret police 
facing loss of property and even life itself or apprehensive of some or all of these 
eventualities. It is obviously for the several governments to endeavor to persuade the 
German Government to permit these people to leave the country unharmed and seek 
homes elsewhere. But even if they could depart from this country no adequate provision 
exists for their admission to other countries. By law they are effectually shut out of the 
one country whose policies and principles they have sought most earnestly to emulate. It 
seems to me that by not opening our doors to a reasonable number of these distressed 
people the United States is likely to appear to the people here who depended upon its 
friendship to the end and to democratic people everywhere as lacking in sincerity and 
humane interest in the very people who have tried to mould their institutions upon its 
model. I think this should not be viewed as an emigration matter but one of the protection 
of innocent human beings from the effect of a catastrophe. 
Carr 
 
26.  March 20, 1939 The Acting Secretary Of State to the Minister in Czechoslovakia 
(Carr) 
124.60F/37a: Telegram 
The Acting Secretary Of State to the Minister in Czechoslovakia (Carr) 
WASHINGTON, March 20, 1939-11 a. m. 
19. In view of the situation as set forth in your telegram of March 17th, you are directed 
to close the Legation at Praha; to turn over the Government building, property and 
archives to the Consulate General; and at your convenience to leave Praha. A separate 
message containing detailed administrative instructions will be sent you. 
The President has requested me to express to you his particular appreciation of the highly 
distinguished service you have rendered the Government as Minister to Czechoslovakia. I 
desire also in the name of the Secretary of State as well as in my own to evidence our 
recognition of the exceptional work you have done under circumstances of-peculiar 
difficulty. The services you have rendered are a matter of pride to the entire Foreign 
Service with which you have been closely connected over a period of so many years. 
I am giving this telegram, together with your March 17th, to the press at noon today. 
Welles 
 
27.  March 20, 1939 The Acting Secretary of State to the German Chargé (Thomsen) 
860F.00/756 
The Acting Secretary of State to the German ChargÈ (Thomsen) 
WASHINGTON, March 20, 1939. 
SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 17 in which, by direction of your 
Government, you inform the Government of the United States of the terms of the decree 
issued on March 16 by the Government of the Reich announcing the assumption of a 
protectorate over the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. 
The Government of the United States has observed that the provinces referred to are now 
under the de facto administration of the German authorities. The Government of the 
United States does not recognize that any legal basis exists for the status so indicated. 
The views of this Government with regard to the situation above referred to, as well as 
with regard to related facts, were made known on March 17. I enclose herewith for the 
information of your Government a copy of the statement in which those views were 
expressed. 
Accept [etc.] Sumner Welles 
 
28.  March 21,  1939 The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Praha (Bruins) 
860F.48/53: Telegram 
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Praha (Bruins) 
WASHINGTON, March 21, 1939 -7 p.m. 
The Department has received a telegram from Nansen, care Norwegian Consulate 
General, Prague, requesting intervention with the German Government to permit refugee 
emigration through Poland. Please advise him that our Embassy at Berlin, in conjunction 
with the British Embassy, has made representations urging that no obstacles be placed in 
the way of departure from Czechoslovakian territory under control of Germany of 
persons who have prospects of admission into the United States or Great Britain. 
Welles 
 
29.  March 21, 1939 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of 
European Affairs (Moffat) 
 
701.60411/268 
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat) 
[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1939. 
The Czechoslovak Minister called this morning. He had been out in Chicago and had 
spent twenty-four hours with Mr. Beneš. He said that although Mr. Beneš was without 
official status, nonetheless he and various other Czechs who do not accept the new 
regime look up to him for advice and guidance and will follow his lead. 
I inquired about published reports that Mr. Beneš might be considering proclaiming a 
new provisional government in this country. He said that there was nothing in the idea, 
that Mr. Benes denials should be taken on their face value, and it had been decided by 
both of them to take no sensational or dramatic stand. 
I then told the Minister that in reply to his question as to whether he could transfer the 
Legation property to the Masaryk Institute, the Legal Adviser had ruled that he could not 
do so. The Legation stood not in his name but in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic, 
and he could only transfer title if he had "full powers" to do so given by the 
Czechoslovak Government or a recognized successor thereto. 
I then told him that we had read in the paper of Mr. Osusky's action in turning over the 
keys of the Czechoslovak Legation in Paris to the French authorities, and intimated that if 
he should choose to follow suit this Government would gladly assume custody. At this 
suggestion the Minister became very excited and said that so long as we did not 
recognize the disappearance of Czechoslovakia he remained the Minister, and counted on 
us to give him full and active support. 
As to Mr. Osusky, he said that he could not understand his activities of late. He was one 
of the few old guard Czechs who had not maintained touch in any way with Mr. Beneš 
since the crisis. 
The Minister then went further, and advanced the doctrine that as his Government had 
disappeared and he could not obtain full powers from his Government, he could act on 
the theory that he was the Czechoslovak Government and control its physical properties 
as he saw fit. Th this connection he referred not only to the Legation building but to 
Czechoslovak gold in New York banks. I pointed out that he should be very careful to 
assure himself that he was on sound legal ground in advancing these claims. Personally I 
felt that there was some doubt as to whether he could act in matters which normally 
required the presentation of full powers. 
The question next arose about the advisability of a visit by Mr. Beneš to Washington. I 
told him that I could inform him in confidence that although the President in other 
circumstances would be delighted to receive Mr. Beneš, he felt that under present 
conditions everybody's interests would be served if Mr. Beneš should refrain from 
coming to Washington or asking an interview with the President. The Minister said that 
this message was not unexpected, and that he would guard its confidential character. 
The Minister next took up the question of his staff. lie does not consider the Counselor of 
Legation sufficiently qualified for the post, and wished to make certain that in in his 
absence Dr. Cerveka would be recognized as ChargÈ d' Affaires…. 
Pierrepont Moffat 
 
30.  March 22, 1939 The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State 
860F.48/55: Telegram 
The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State 
BERLIN, March 22, 1939-11 a.m.  
[Received March 22- 8:40 a. m.] 
188. Department's 51, March 17, 6 p.m. I saw Doctor Woermann at the Foreign Office 
and made urgent representations in the sense of the Department's telegram above referred 
to. Doctor Woermann stated that the British ChargÈ d' Affaires had made a similar 
request with regard to persons holding visas for England and that he would take 
immediate measures to see that our wish was made known to-the proper authorities in 
Praha. 
I discussed at some length with Doctor Woermaun the question of achieving orderly 
emigration from Germany of persons whose departure was urged by the German 
authorities. Doctor Woermann reiterated the position taken by Goering in his 
conversations with Rublee, namely that the German Government desired to cooperate in 
achieving an orderly emigration from this country. I pointed out that if events in 
Czechoslovakia resulted in the driving of a large number of persons out of newly 
occupied territories, it would have a serious detrimental effect upon the arrangements 
now being made by certain other countries to facilitate orderly emigration from Germany. 
Doctor Woermann asserted that he would take the necessary measures to bring this 
observation to the attention of the authorities concerned. 
Geist 
 
[For the President's proclamation of March 23, 1939, suspending the operation of the 
trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, see Department of State, Press Releases, March 25, 
1939, page 241, or 53 Stat. 2530.] 
 
31.  March 24, 1939 The Minister in Guatemala (Des Portes) to the Secretary of State 
8605.00/762: Telegram 
 
The Minister in Guatemala (Des Portes) to the Secretary of State 
GUATEMALA CITY, March 24, 1939-4 p. m.  
[Received 6: 12 p.m.] 
8. The Foreign Office has just informed me that the German Legation has formally 
notified this Government of the absorption of Czechoslovakia and that the 
communication has been acknowledged without comment. President Ubico now requests 
the advice and counsel of the American Government as to the attitude which should be 
adopted with respect to this aggression. He also suggests the convenience and desirability 
of the United States taking the initiative in effecting throughout Latin America a common 
policy and united front towards the de facto occupation. The Department's telegraphic 
instructions would be appreciated. 
Des Portes 
 
32.  March 24, 1939 Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary Of State, March 24, 
1939 
860F.00/778 
Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary Of State, March 24, 1939 
At the press conference this afternoon, Secretary Hull, returning from an absence of two 
weeks and responding to the greeting of the correspondents, said that he was more than 
pleased to be back. He went on to say that he wished to make the following remarks 
which might be quoted: 
"Having closely followed international developments at home and abroad during my 
temporary absence I have in common with the general public here been profoundly 
shocked by the recent developments in Europe. They have been of a nature seriously to 
threaten the peace of the world. 
"These new evidences of international lawlessness make it all the more clear that never 
before has the support of all nations for law and order and sound economic relations been 
more urgently needed than at present. We in this country have striven, particularly during 
recent years, and we shall continue to strive, to strengthen the threatened structure of 
world peace by fostering in every possible way the rule of law and the building of sound 
economic relationships upon which alone peace can rest. Every citizen and every group 
in this country will, I am sure, cooperate loyally and wholeheartedly in this great and 
urgent task." 
 
33.  March 25, 1939 The Consul General at Praha (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 
[discusses Slovak declaration of independence] 
860F.00/768: Telegram 
The Consul General at Praha (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 
PRAHA, March 25, 1939-4 p. m.  
[Received 5:30 p. m] 
Under no circumstances to become public at present. Following from Minister Carr: 
"During the last few days I have obtained details of some of the events in this country 
which I shall report in due time but the sub-stance of the following I think the 
Department should have by telegraph. In regard to Slovakia information received from 
two highly responsible sources indicates unmistakably that Slovak declaration of 
independence was the result of German intrigue and dictation and not the voluntary 
expression of the will of the Slovaks; that Tiso went to Berlin at the request of B¸rckel, 
Seyss-Inquart and German generals; that Tiso was told by Hitler on the 13th that he had 
decided to occupy Bohemia and Moravia at 12 o'clock on the 14th and that the Slovaks 
would choose between declaring their independence under German protection or having 
Hitler dissociate himself from them; that while Tiso was reporting on the 14th to the Diet 
the majority of which was opposed to separation from the Czechoslovak State, Karmasin 
entered and warned Tiso that the hour for German occupation was near and they should 
declare their independence which they did amid demonstrations of great emotion. 
Referring to the visit of the President to Berlin (see my telegrams numbers 35, March 15 
and 53, March 19 [18]) information from a high source impossible at present to reveal is 
in substance that owing to the news of the concentration of German troops on the 
Czechoslovak frontier and with the approval of the Government, the President of 
Czechoslovakia on the 13th asked for an interview with Hitler. The reply granting the 
interview came at 2 o 'clock in the afternoon of the 14th. The President accompanied by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs left on a special train for Berlin at 4 o'clock. Meanwhile 
the German troops had already crossed the Silesian frontier at 12 o'clock and at 4:30 they 
entered Moravska Ostrava. The train was delayed and the President did not reach Berlin 
until 11. The conference with Hitler began about 1:00 in the presence of a number of 
German generals. Hitler announced his unalterable decision to occupy Bohemia and 
Moravia with the German military forces at 6 o'clock that morning, the 15th; said he had 
been willing to receive the President only in the ho hope of preventing resistance on the 
part of the Czechs and therefore bloodshed; demanded that the Czechoslovak Army be 
disarmed and kept in barracks, that railways, postal service, Government offices, theaters 
should continue to function and the people go about their work and warned that any 
resistance would be put down by the most drastic and even brutal methods. He claimed 
that he had reached his decision because of the failure of the Government to carry out 
definitely his wishes including measures against the Jews. He said he did not question the 
sincerity of the President and the Foreign Minister but clearly they were too weak. He 
then suggested that they might wish to consult their Government in Praha. In an adjoining 
room telephones were ready with a direct wire to the Prime Minister in Praha. On the 
way to the telephone Goering remarked to them that he would regret if resistance were 
offered for that would make it necessary for him under his orders to destroy Praha with 
his air force. The old President showed unsteadiness from the strain and fatigue and a 
stimulant was suggested. A physician was already at hand and administered a 
hypodermic injection. The President and the Foreign Minister telephoned to Praha but 
always in the presence of Hitler's aides. Praha telephoned in an hour that the terms [were 
accepted?] and orders given not to resist. The President then re-ported to Hitler and said 
his people were now in Hitler's hands and appealed to his 'chivalry'. Further discussion 
occurred and the communiquÈ later announced to the press was prepared and signed. 
There was no compulsion as to that. Hitler said he would give the provinces autonomy 
and added 'you cannot dream what we shall do for you; we shall give you autonomy and 
far exceed anything you did for the Sudeten Germans'. The German Army crossed the 
frontiers generally at 6 o'clock and began to arrive at Praha about 8:30 the morning of the 
15th. The President reached Praha about 8 p. m., and immediately summoned the Council 
of Ministers. While he was relating his experiences in Berlin he was told that Hitler was 
already in the Presidential Palace. He refused to believe it. One of the Ministers went to 
investigate and returned to say that he had spoken with Von Ribbentrop and seen the 
Fuehrer. They had in fact arrived by automobile in advance of the President and unknown 
to him. The following day Ribbentrop read to the public (see my 42, March 16, and 43, 
March 16) the proclamation declaring that the two provinces of Bohemia and Moravia 
should constitute a protectorate and be a part of greater Germany. 
My informant says the President is completely powerless and is actuated by purely 
patriotic motives in continuing temporarily to serve." 
Linell 
 
34.  March 26, 1939 The Secretary of State to the Minister in Guatemala (Des Portes) 
860F.00/762: Telegram 
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Guatemala (Des Portes) 
WASHINGTON, March 26,1939-noon. 
11. Your 8, March 24, 4 p.m. After thanking the Foreign Minister for his confidence in 
consulting this Government with respect to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia you 
should give him copies of the statement issued by the Acting Secretary on March 17, and 
a copy of the reply of this Government to the note from the German Embassy, this reply 
being dated March 20 (see radio bulletin for texts). 
Although, as is evident from the statement of the Acting Secretary, the Department views 
with concern recent developments in Central Europe, it does not believe that these 
developments present occasion -for initiating the procedure of consultation as provided 
for in the Buenos Aires Pact and the Declaration of Lima. The Foreign Minister's 
suggestion will be borne in mind, however, for future reference. 
Hull 
 
35.  March 27, 1939 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of 
European Affairs (Moffat) 
701.60F11/277 
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat) 
[WASHINGTON,] March 27,1939. 
The Czechoslovak Minister came in this morning saying that for the first time in a 
fortnight he felt inclined to smile. The reason was he now believed that his own 
authorities in Praha, in their heart of hearts, approved the stand that he had taken. In the 
last two or three days there had been received from Praha some funds for the Consulate 
General at New York and some funds for the Legation. Obviously the Germans could not 
watch over every administrative detail, and he regarded this transfer as in the nature of an 
unwritten message to him. 
Even more important, some of the private Czech banks which had money on deposit in 
New York had transferred their accounts to the National Bank of Czechoslovakia. He, the 
Minister, could naturally do nothing with accounts in this country of private banks, but 
this did not apply to deposits of the National Bank. As a matter of fact, he had been in 
New York and talked the whole situation over with the Chase Bank. The Chase Bank has 
asked him to write- them a letter forbidding them to transfer any money on deposit to the 
account of the National Bank, back to Czechoslovakia. If there is a lawsuit, the Chase 
Bank is prepared to defend it. 
The Minister went on to say that he felt his primary task was to keep his financial 
transactions so above-board that he could not become the subject of criticism. He had 
under his control various sums of money belonging to individuals which he could not 
transfer to their owners. He asked whether we would accept these funds. I told him that I 
did not believe we had authority in law to do so, but that this matter should be taken up 
with the Legal Adviser. He said he would ask Mr. Acheson to discuss the matter with Mr. 
Hackworth. 
The Minister then went on to say that he was putting all employees of the Legation and 
Consulates, except the few that were absolutely essential, on a leave status. They would 
be carried as absent on our various lists. I told him that if any of them accepted other 
employment we could naturally not continue to give them immunities or carry their 
names on any lists. The Minister agreed, and undertook promptly to let us know if and 
when any of them accepted employment. As a matter of fact, he said that they were 
having difficulty in securing employment as many firms had answered that as a matter of 
policy they would not engage aliens who had not yet taken out their first papers. He 
asked if we could intervene with the A. F. of L. or the C. I. O. I told him that I did not 
think the Department could do this, but if he chose to send one of his secretaries to the 




36.  March 28, 1939 The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Hungary (Travers) 
[American refusal to recognize Slovak independence] 
860F.01/268 
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Hungary (Travers) 
No.872  
WASHINGTON, August 28, 1939. 
SIR: With reference to the legation's despatch No.1701 of August 7,1939 concerning the 
question of the de facto recognition of Slovakia, there is transmitted for your confidential 
information a copy of a memorandum prepared in the Department on August 17 on this 
subject. This memorandum sets forth the position which the Department has assumed in 
this connection and from which it is unwilling to recede. 
The Department perceives no useful purpose in pursuing conversations on this matter 
with the "Minister of Slovakia". 
Very truly yours,  
For the Secretary of State: 
G. S. Messersmith 
 
[enclosure - Memorandum] 
[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1939. 
A Consulate cannot very well be established in Slovakia by the United States unless this 
Government is willing to recede from the position assumed by it on the German 
occupation of Czechoslovakia last March. At that time, namely on March 17, the State 
Department advised the Treasury that "in view of the recent military occupation of the 
Provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia of Czechoslovakia by German armed 
forces and the assumption of control over these areas by German authorities, the State 
Department, while not recognizing any legal basis for the assumption of so-called 
protection over this territory, is constrained by force of the foregoing circumstances to 
regard the above-mentioned Provinces as being under the de facto administration of the 
German authorities….  
On March 14, 1939, Dr. F. Duransky', "Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia," 
addressed an appeal to the American Government for recognition of the Slovak State. 
This was filed without acknowledgment. A similar communication was apparently sent to 
the Argentine Government as the Ambassador of that country asked the Department what 
it intended to do about it as Argentina wished to pursue the same course as the United 
States. Several American diplomatic representatives abroad have also been approached 
by Slovak officials for recognition of the State of Slovakia. The principal reason for these 
overtures was the difficulties which have arisen over the marking of goods from this area 
in connection with their importation into the United States. 
On July 11 the Consulate General in Prague informed the Department by telegram that 
the local press had reported that Slovak official circles had made it known that after July 
15 consular offices of all states which had not recognized the new Slovak State would no 
longer be permitted to function in Slovakia. Nothing further in this connection has been 
received by the Department. 
Despite the hardships that may be suffered because of the nonexistence of an American 
consular office in Slovakia, both by those resident in Slovakia and in the United States, it 
is not thought that this Government is prepared to abandon its position of non-recognition 
of Slovakia. The situation in Slovakia has not changed and German military forces 
occupy parts of Western and Northern Slovakia. There, therefore, appears to be no 
alternative but to inform Dr. Wise in the above sense. 
 
37.  May 23, 1939 The Consul General at Prague (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 
860F.00/863 
The Consul General at Prague (Linnell) to the Secretary of State 
No. 98  
PRAGUE, May 23, 1939. 
[Received June 9.] 
SIR: On pages 4 to 6 of the report which accompanied my despatch No. 84 of May 15, 
1939, I mentioned a few of the main features of the unsatisfactory state of political 
developments in the Czech lands. I now have the honor to report that the past week has 
shown a still further deterioration in the relations between Czechs and Germans, and that 
the resulting tension is approaching a point where the Czech leaders themselves may find 
it impossible to continue their cooperation in the maintenance of the fiction of a Czech 
autonomous regime. 
That Czech "autonomy" has proved a fiction is no longer open to doubt. Despite 
continued German assurances to the contrary the Protectorate system, as guaranteed to 
the Czechs by the Reichs Chancellor in his decree of March 16, has never been seriously 
put into effect. Such steps as were originally taken towards even the formal observance of 
its provisions are now being steadily retracted in practice if not in theory. 
The civil administration, which was supposed to have been restored to the Czech 
authorities upon the relinquishment of executive authority by the Reichswehr in April, 
has actually remained in German hands. There has been no move to withdraw the 
numerous commissars, many of them Sudeten Germans with various personal axes to 
grind, who were appointed to all the central ministries and to many municipal offices and 
state enterprises in March. The same is true of the German "Landrats" who were set up 
throughout the countryside during the period of the exercise of civil authority by the 
Reichswehr. Each of these officials has assigned to him a given field of competence 
comprising several of the existing Czech administrative districts (comparable to our 
counties). In these territories they continue to exercize real administrative authority with 
no legal basis whatsoever. The Czech district officials often report to them and take 
orders from them rather than from their own dormant Ministry of the Interior. Cases are 
known where failure to do this, or at least to obey the Landrat's instructions, has been 
followed by prompt arrest. The Landrats themselves are subordinated through the 
Reichsprotektor's office to the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Last week they were all 
summoned to Prague to confer directly with Herr von Stuckart, who handles Protectorate 
affairs in that Ministry and who came to Prague expressly for this purpose. 
In many instances, the Czech authorities are being simply displaced by those of the Reich. 
This has been the case, for example, with the customs officials on the Polish and Slovak 
borders. It is characteristic that the Czech central authorities no longer even know 
precisely where these borders lie. There are indications - although the Slovaks deny this - 
that the Germans have been altering the Slovak-Moravian border at will, during the last 
few weeks, with no consultation of the Czech authorities. Quite probably, the same thing 
has been happening on the other frontiers as well. 
In their administrative activities the German authorities are actively assisted by the 
various German police units - Schutzpolizei, SS and Gestapo - which are present in all 
sizeable Czech communities despite the fact that the Law of March 16 provides as little 
justification for their presence as for that of the Landrats and the Commissars. Quite 
recently, these police units have developed intense activity. As nearly as can be 
ascertained in the absence of official information, the number of arrests has been 
increasing daily. The existing prisons are overcrowded and old ones, long in disuse under 
the Czech regime, are again being put into operation. Tales of brutality, of physical and 
mental torture, seem unfortunately to be only too well authenticated. All in all, it would 
scarcely be an exaggeration to say that "terror", in the accepted totalitarian sense, had 
now begun, and that the Czech authorities are quite powerless to oppose it. 
It is obvious that in these circumstances, the position of the Czech Government is 
anything but enviable. As far as I am aware, it has had nothing of any importance to do 
during the last month but to draft two laws at German behest and submit them to the 
Reichsprotektor for consideration. Meanwhile, personal relations between some of its 
members and leaders of the Reichsprotektor's office have become strained. As was 
anticipated, Baron von Neurath seems to be playing a much less conspicuous role in 
Prague than certain of his subordinates. Herr Frank (formerly deputy Gauleiter in the 
Sudeten district) and Dr. Sebekovsky (formerly Regierungspr”sident in Karisbad) are 
now said to be the most active members of his staff. Both are Sudeten Germans and 
neither is in any sense persona grata to the Czechs. In general, it may be said that if the 
Germans ever had any intention of appeasing the Czechs, the wide-spread admission of 
Sudeten-Germans to positions of influence in the Protectorate has been the worst mistake 
they could have made. During the past century, if we may believe the historians, it was 
largely the Sudetens who ruined relations between the Czechs and Vienna. They are now 
in a fair way to repeating this performance with respect to the relations between the 
Czechs and Berlin. 
But Czech anxiety is not confined to the future of the Czech administration, which they 
regard as a lost cause in any case. It is the German attitude with respect to President 
Hacha's new Czech political movement, the so-called "National Community", which is 
arousing the greatest apprehension in influential Czech circles. For it is on this movement 
that they are depending for the preservation of their own unity and discipline pending the 
day when it may again become possible for them to assert themselves actively in 
opposition to the German rule. 
It has been related in previous communications from this office that the organization of 
the National Community was a conspicuous success and that its leaders even succeeded 
in gaining the adherence of over 97 percent of those eligible for membership. While the 
movement first seemed to find favor in German eyes as a gesture towards totalitarianism, 
its' success aroused definite irritation in German circles. The Czechs, it seems, were 
expected to make the effort but they were not expected to succeed. The Germans had 
evidently hoped that a large proportion of the Czechs would remain outside the 
movement and would thus constitute an element which could always be played off 
against the remainder of the Czech population for the advancement of German aims. 
Since this hope did not materialize, the Germans have now adopted a definitely hostile 
tone toward the movement and are using the only remaining available element, namely 
the Czech fascists, as a lever for the creation of dissension among the Czech population.  
It will be recalled that the Czech fascists, under the leadership of General Gayda, 
endeavored to gain control of Czech political life immediately after the occupation but 
were pushed out with German connivance in favor of President Hacha and his friends. 
For some time after that the fascists wavered. They were torn between admiration for 
Nationalist-Socialist methods, which drew them toward the Germans, and nationalistic 
tendencies, which drew them toward the overwhelming anti-German majority of the 
Czech population. Their indecision was aggravated by the personality of their leader, who 
commanded little confidence among the Germans and who was himself never marked by 
any great clarity or firmness of decision. Dissension soon developed between the 
Moravian and the Bohemian sections. More recently, the Moravian section began to 
receive extensive support, financially and otherwise from the Gestapo. At the beginning 
of May, Gayda, finally disillusioned of German motives, tried to lead his followers into a 
dissolution of the whole movement, to be followed by a merging with the "National 
Community" Had this step succeeded, the Czech nation would have been truly united in 
the face of German occupation. But the Moravian wing, acting doubtless on Gestapo 
inspiration, revolted, carrying with it a portion of the Bohemian party as well, and has 
now set itself up in opposition not only to Gayda but also to President Hacha and the 
"National Community". The result has been retaliation on the part of the President 
through the removal of the recalcitrant fascist members of the Committee of National 
Community. The break is now complete, and is fraught with danger for the preservation 
of Czech unity. For while the fascists have thus far been numerically insignificant, 
German support is nothing to be sneezed at. Money is always a powerful weapon, and the 
fascist press claims that membership is now increasing rapidly, ten thousand members 
having been added within the last week. 
In the face of this situation the Czech leaders are now wondering whether the 
disadvantages of nominal cooperation with the Germans are not beginning to outweigh 
the advantages. They see clearly what the Germans are trying to do to them. They are 
afraid that their continued participation-however devoid of content in the Protectorate 
Government will only compromise them in the eyes of their own people without 
accomplishing anything tangible for their followers. They are coming to the conclusion 
that they would have better chances of preserving Czech unity as frank opponents of the 
German rule rather than as nominal participants in it. 
For these reasons, I am reliably informed, they are contemplating some sort of a 
voluntary step on their own part which would put an end to their participation in the 
Government and to their cooperation with the Germans in general and would leave them 
in a position to come out openly, in opposition to the Germans, as whole-hearted 
protagonists and leaders of Czech separatism. They would prefer this course, which 
might well turn out to be a form of martyrdom, to the continuance of a cooperation which 
has proved so one-sided. 
They are only waiting at the present moment for the favorable outcome of the Anglo-
Russian conversations before taking this step. Despite the various disillusionments of the 
past year, they still have great hopes for the eventual efficacy of support from England 
and the United States, and they feel that if Germany were to be backed to the wall 
diplomatically there might be some possibility for at least a partial retraction of the action 
which the Germans have taken in the Czech lands. How long they can continue to wait, 
however, is problematical. The situation is becoming daily more difficult for them, and 
they have always to bear in mind the possibility that the Germans may anticipate them by 
abolishing or changing the Protectorate before they get around to making their own move. 
If President Hacha and the National Community should back out on the Germans in this 
fashion, it is difficult to predict what would follow. The fascists are already pressing for 
seats on the Protectorate Government, and there might be an attempt to set up another 
Government composed exclusively of Czech fascists. But the moral authority of such a 
body-which represents its chief value to the Germans-would be minimal, and its 
popularity no greater than those of the puppet regimes established by the Japanese in 
China. The job of finding a new president would present a problem of particular 
difficulty. 
Whether such a regime could serve as an effective instrument of German control is 
doubtful. I consider it more probable that the Germans will find themselves forced in the 
end to sweep away the last figments of Czech autonomy; to place their reliance solely on 
their bayonets and to attempt to crush by sheer force the powerful Czech nationalism 
which they have hitherto tried to exploit. In this case, it is outright war: an undeclared 
war in which imprisonments, shootings, deportations, intimidation and bribery on the one 
side would be pitted against passive resistance, sabotage, espionage and conspiracy on 
the other. If it comes to this, the Germans will probably hold the upper hand without 
undue difficulty as long as the broad basis of national-socialist power remains intact. But 
they will have no happy time of it, and if the tide ever turns, Czech retaliation will be 
fearful to contemplate. 
Respectfully yours, 
Irving N. Linnell 
 
38.  June 26, 1939 The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 
142.14/2427: Telegram 
The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State 
Rome, June 26, 1939-4 p. m.  
[Received June 26-3:20 p. m.] 
234. I have just received the following communication dated June 22, from the Slovak 
Minister to Italy: 
"Lacking other channels I permit myself to address Your Excellency personally 
requesting that you intervene with the competent authorities of the United States in the 
following matter: 
The United States customs authorities require of our exporters that merchandise 
originating in Slovakia be marked 'made in Germany'. The Slovak exporters are unable to 
comply with any such requirement in view of the fact that Slovakia is an independent 
country from the political as well as from the economic point of view and is not bound to 
Germany other than by a treaty of friendship and guarantee such as have often been 
concluded in recent times. The Slovak Government, by governmental decision of March 
14th last, declared that it would maintain in force all the international agreements 
concluded by the Czechoslovak Republic. Consequently as far as concerns Slovakia there 
remains in effect also the commercial agreements entered into between the United States 
of America and Czechoslovakia. 
Furthermore the Slovak Republic has not entered into a customs union with Germany; it 
has its own national bank and its money-the Slovak crown. 
The Slovak Government earnestly desires not only to continue to maintain the good 
relations which have so happily developed between my country and the United States but 
also to strengthen them as much as possible." 
I have refrained from entering into official relations with the Slovak Minister and should 
consequently appreciate having the Department's instructions concerning the response 
which should be made to his letter. 
Phillips 
 
39.  June 28, 1939 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) 
142.14/2427: Telegram 
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) 
WASHINGTON, June 28,1939-5 p. m. 
59. Your 234, June 26, 4 p. m. Should you feel that there is occasion to reply to the 
Slovak Minister you should confine yourself to the statement that you have referred his 
communication to the Department. 
For your own information the position of this Government with regard to Slovakia as set 
forth in Radio Bulletin No. 63 of March 17, 1939 has not changed. 
Hull 
 
40.  August 7, 1939 The Chargé in Hungary (Travers) to the Secretary of State [Slovak 
government requests de facto recognition] 
142.14/2427: Telegram 
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) 
WASHINGTON, June 28,1939-5 p. m. 
59. Your 234, June 26, 4 p. m. Should you feel that there is occasion to reply to the 
Slovak Minister you should confine yourself to the statement that you have referred his 
communication to the Department. 
For your own information the position of this Government with regard to Slovakia as set 
forth in Radio Bulletin No. 63 of March 17, 1939 has not changed. 
Hull 
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